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Abstract 
This article attempts to show that Chinese post-socialist transformation has 
involved a deep change in its growth regime. China's current growth strategy 
is the consequence of institutional changes that operated from the end of the 
seventies. Thus, since its transition is gradual, the economic system is 
"hybrid" with both capitalist and socialist elements. 
 
During the Maoist era, the growth strategy took the form of a "forced 
growth" as theorized by Kornai (1972). Today, it is not the case anymore 
since China follows an export and investment-led growth regime. Indeed, 
"investment hunger", inherited from the socialist system, is still standing and 
the economic opening of China results in an increase of its exports. This new 
situation could be particularly difficult to manage with respect to inflation 
stabilization and China’s dependence on external demand in a context of low 
domestic-demand. In particular, the main difficulty to which this export-led 
growth regime could be confronted with concerns the occurrence of an 
external contraction in the US. We then try to assess why such an event may 
appear by providing a list of external risks and their possible outlets in order 
to emphasize the economic vulnerability of China.  
 
Finally, we conclude on the difficulty to switch regimes and to adopt a more 
balanced growth strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Institutional Change, Post-socialist Transformation, China, export-led growth 
JEL Classification: B52, F19, P33 
                                                 
1
 The authors would like to thank Sylvie Lupton without whose assistance this paper could not be prepared in the 
present form. 
∗
 E-mail: sebcharles92@yahoo.fr  
**
 E-mail: ilyess.el-karouni@univ-paris8.fr  
 1
Introduction 
 
During the last 30 years, we have witnessed the gradual collapse of the Chinese Maoist 
system. China experienced some reforms which made it become a superpower with a 
phenomenal economic growth. Although the Chinese Communist Party still leads the country, 
it is not the same country as that of Mao's era. And the foreign firms have often introduced 
advanced technologies. For instance, in 2005, the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
was higher than $ 60 billion (cf. US-China Business Council). As for the large-scale famine 
experienced by China during the Great Leap forward (1958-60), it does not exist anymore 
since familial contracts in 1979. Even though numerous problems have been solved, it seems 
that new difficulties may appear regarding the export and investment led growth strategy 
followed by China. 
We argue that Chinese institutional change began with China's opening. Admittedly, this 
opening began under Mao and the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and 
the US with the official visit of President Nixon. But the breaking point was the death of Mao 
and, above all, the plenary meeting of December 1978. The institutional change appeared 
openly taking the form of a gradual exit from Maoist socialism2. These transformations had 
serious consequences on the Chinese socio-economic system. China's current growth regime 
is the consequence of institutional changes that operated from the end of the seventies. Here, 
our objective is to answer to the following question: what are the risks of the Chinese growth 
regime emanating from the post-socialist transformation? In this article, we put the emphasis 
on the dependence of China toward foreign countries especially the US and Europe. 
The outline of the paper is the following. First, we detail the institutional background of 
our study, i.e. the Chinese post-socialist transformation (I). Second, we compare growth 
regimes both in Maoist and post Maoist eras (II). Finally, we deal with the difficulties and 
challenges of the current growth regime (III). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The often used term "transition" seems to be inappropriate because it implicitly assumes that China gave up 
socialism to adopt capitalism. However, we are currently unable to be objective about the form of the Chinese 
economic system at the end of the process. So, we prefer to use the term "transformation" which evades the 
determinist aspect of the Chinese institutional change. 
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I. Institutional background: the Chinese post-socialist transformation 
 
The post-socialist transformation experienced by China since the end of the 1970's is a 
typical case of institutional change. Here, institutions (as defined by North [1990]: formal and 
informal rules which constrain human action and their enforcement mechanisms) altered 
gradually. The existence of a Stock Exchange Market in a country in which the Communist 
Party has all powers was unthinkable during Mao's era. Moreover, Deng Xiao Ping did not 
hesitate to proclaim "letting some people get rich first, and gradually all people should get 
rich together". These are only two examples of the transformation of institutions and 
mentalities in China. The process under way since the end of the 1970's is not yet completed, 
and nothing assures that it will be one day. 
For a start, let us consider three types of economic change. The first one is economic 
policy as illustrated by the IS-LM model. In this model, knowing the parameters of an 
economy (propensity to spend, elasticity of money demand…), we have to find the income of 
full-employment by using tools of economic policy (public expenditures and money supply). 
Consequently, this model aims at finding a solution to temporary disequilibria ("fine-tuning"). 
The second form of economic change is reform. It tries to redress more structural disequilibria 
and is implemented less systematically because it often needs political or social consensus. 
Finally, the third type is systemic change that concerns the transition from a system to 
another: China, Russia and other countries of Eastern Europe experienced such a change. The 
objective is to rebuild a new order with new institutions. This kind of change is at the heart of 
our article. Such a change can be more or less fast, taking the form of a shock therapy (like in 
Russia or Poland) or it can be gradual (like in China). In the first case, decision-makers decide 
to move from socialism to capitalism through a unique wave of reforms. In the second case, 
reforms are implemented gradually.  
During the 20th century, the world has experienced two economic systems: capitalism and 
socialism. Kornai (2000) shows us the differences between those two systems in a systemic 
and institutionalist view. He uses five criteria to differentiate them and integrates these 
distinctions in a series of blocks. In this figure, the first three blocks represent an institutional 
characteristic while blocks 4 and 5 represent economic phenomena. Therefore, we have: 
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- Block 1: political power; 
- Block 2: property rights; 
- Block 3: coordination mechanisms; 
- Block 4: behaviour; 
- Block 5: typical economic phenomenona  
 
Each system is characterized by a special configuration in terms of blocks. Blocks 4 and 5 
depend on blocks 1, 2 and 3 which represent the foundations of the system studied. By 
examining these three pillars, we can classify a system in one or another category (socialism 
or capitalism). That is why coming across some "socialist" elements again in a country is not 
enough to call it "socialist". For instance, in France, the public sector is relatively significant, 
but France is not a socialist system since the other elements of the system (blocks 1, 2 and 3) 
are typically capitalist. The configuration is drawn as follows: 
 
Figure 1: The model of socialist and capitalist systems 
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As for the change of systems per se, Kornai considers that it will not come into effect until a 
breakdown occurs at the level of the political block. From this perspective, even if the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) stays in power, China would be a country in transition 
because we note the “embourgeoisement” of the political power. From an ideological 
viewpoint, it is not hostile to market and private property anymore. On the contrary, the 
Chinese march toward a market economy takes place under its acceptance. Despite every 
indication of the contrary, it is not the same Party anymore because its ideals have changed. 
The growth regime should be looked for in blocks 4 and 5 but it depends on changes that 
occur upstream (blocks 1, 2 and 3). A set of factors (cultural, political, and institutional) then 
led the economic growth in Maoist China to take the form of a "rush" with forced growth and 
"disharmony". Along the same line, the transformation of these same factors led China to base 
its growth on external demand. The following section will be precisely devoted to the 
examination of both growth regimes. 
 
 
II. The nature of economic growth in China 
 
II.1. Forced growth during the Maoist era 
The current growth in the post-socialist China contrasts with the existing one during the 
Maoist era: the forced growth (Kornai, 1972) as illustrated by the Great Leap Forward. It also 
contrasts with a more "harmonic" growth that could be seen as an ideal-type. Forced growth 
should ensure the production of resources needed by the development of the economic sectors 
considered to be the most important. So in Maoist China, during the Great Leap Forward, the 
productive resources were drawn from agriculture into industry. 
Several factors affect the speed of growth in one way or another. For instance, Kornai 
(1972) mentions natural resources, geopolitical considerations (like war or peace), exogenous 
factors… But, above all, he insists on the fact that sacrifice, postponing and omission are in 
favour of the increase in growth. 
The notion of sacrifice is very intuitive. Forced growth is characterized by an aware 
renunciation of a certain level of consumption in order to not jeopardize future. By doing so, 
it would be possible to increase profitable investment and therefore to generate growth and a 
greater level of consumption in the future. There is consequently a trade-off between present 
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consumption/future investment and future consumption/current investment3. If we spend less 
today, it would be possible to export what is not spent and to invest export revenue. In the 
case of sacrifice, unlike postponent, renunciation of consumption is absolute. This means that 
individuals cannot often make up past consumption. Postponing also consists in abandoning 
our present consumption, but unlike sacrifice, it is not absolute. Omission (or negligence) 
means an irreversible loss too insofar as it concerns the formation of capital stock 
(particularly human capital like instruction). The negative effects of omission still stand even 
after its end. However, in all cases, the share of investment in GDP is very important. 
Although living conditions are difficult due to the sacrifices required from the population, the 
decision-makers count on workers’ competitive spirit. More ideological incentives (like 
socialist conscience that is put forward in the Chinese system) can replace traditional 
economic incentives (notably monetary incentives). 
The Great Leap Forward which began near the end of the 1950's and ended in the 
beginning of the 1960’s illustrates this conception of growth. This experience was disastrous: 
it resulted in a dreadful famine. Depending on sources, between thirty and fifty million people 
died of starvation in only three to four years (from 1958-59 to 1961). Causes were numerous. 
Agriculture was neglected, so agricultural production plummeted and became insufficient. 
Furthermore, for ideological reasons, the level of harvest was greatly overvalued. So, taxes 
were too high with respect to the real level of agricultural production. Taxes were paid in kind 
and peasant stocks fell. Moreover, bad weather conditions (floods and drought in 1959 and 
1960) aggravated the crisis and famine. All these factors contributed to this human disaster. 
Nevertheless, we cannot understand this growth strategy if we do not explain the expansion 
drive and the investment hunger which exist in socialist systems. This will be developed in 
the next section.   
 
II.2. Investment Hunger and Economic Growth 
Like other socialist countries, China is characterized by expansion drive and investment 
hunger. According to Kornai (1980, 1992), investment hunger corresponds to an internal 
desire of expansion. Since Chinese post-socialist transformation is gradual, it is quite 
understandable that some institutional features of post Maoist China are inherited from the 
Maoist era. When Mao and the CCP took power, China was drained. And in order to win the 
                                                 
3
 Note that Chinese decision-makers, who were Marxists, by encouraging savings and frugality, added up, in 
some respects, the conclusions of Solow's neoclassical model of growth (Solow, 1956) and optimal growth 
theory (cf. Cass, 1965). 
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population's trust, they had to improve living conditions of Chinese people. The best way to 
do this was to increase the economic growth which must be as fast as possible. Expansion 
drive and investment hunger also exist in capitalist economies. But, unlike socialist countries, 
they are limited by an internally self-restraint. Indeed, the budget constraint of a capitalist 
firm is hard (i.e. its revenue has to cover its costs, Kornai 1993) and decision-makers should 
therefore assess investment risks. In case of a bad assessment, the consequences will be 
directly borne by the firm. Furthermore, Keynes (1936) considers that firms compare the 
marginal efficiency of capital with the interest rate. Managers invest if and only if the former 
is higher than the latter. Things are different in the classical socialist system. Because of 
shortage and soft budget constraints (see for instance Kornai, 1979, 1986 who explains that 
socialist firms are not subjected to the budget constraint), decision-makers are deeply 
encouraged to increase investment expenditures. Unlike the capitalist firm (with a "hard" 
budget constraint), the survival of a socialist firm depends on its relations with bureaucracy 
and not on its profits. Despite their bad results, Chinese state owned enterprises do not go 
bankrupt. Within the framework of an economy in which the administrative coordination is 
still important, an expression of the assistance of bureaucracy is the "soft" credit. That is why 
in classical socialist systems, investment hunger is ubiquitous and it is a desirable tool to 
generate growth. Today investment hunger inherited from this period is still common as Table 
1 demonstrates.  
 
Table 1: Investment data 
 1973 1983 1993 2003 
Share of investment  
in real GDP  34.1 33.7 38.6 42.6 
 
 
1973-1983 1983-1993 1993-2003 
Average growth rates based on 
constant prices (1990) 8.8 19.8 16.7 
Contribution to GDP  
growth 33.3 41.6 45.4 
         Source: Felipe et Lim (2005) 
 
In China, this investment hunger is strengthened by federalism that is a key element of the 
reform process (Vahabi, 2002). Because of the reform of taxation and decollectivization, local 
governments have more power and more incentives to growth (Oi, 1992, 1996, 1999). These 
institutional reforms and new incentives lead to a peculiar form of economic organization 
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which is coined "local State corporatism" by Oi (1992). Since reforms in the beginning of the 
1980's, although decollectivization resulted in a loss of income for local governments, 
taxation reform allowed them to retain a part of taxes. In addition, the reform of bureaucracy 
also generated new incentives for the bureaucrats to go into business (the so-called xiahai) (cf. 
Li, 1998). 
 
II.3. Recent Transformation: An Export-Led Growth Economy 
During the Mao era, the economic relations of China with capitalist economies were 
peculiar to its socialist nature with Import Hunger, Export Aversion and Propensity to 
Indebtedness as mentioned by Kornai (1992). Today, this is not the case anymore, as we shall 
analyse below. 
 
Some stylized facts 
In three decades, China, more than any other country before, has known an impressive 
commercial and economic development. Indeed, its growth rates are sustained: for instance, 
between 1998 and 2006, the Chinese average growth rate of GDP is greater than 9% (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Chinese GDP growth rate 
Years 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth Rate (%) 7.8 7.6 8.4 8.3 9.1 10.0 10.1 10.2 10.7 
   Source: US-China Business Council, 2007 
 
This development has been accompanied by several warnings, regarding its banking 
system considered as extremely fragile due to the important number of important debts. Since 
2003, the government implements a policy of discharge of the banking system. Even if the 
result of reforms remains uncertain (cf. Havrylchyk, 2005) –in particular due to the flow of 
new loans – it seems to be heading in the right direction in order to limit the risks of collapse 
of the Chinese banking and financial system. As for its balance of trade, Figure 2 shows that 
China has recurrent surplus since 1994. This period should be distinguished from the previous 
one in which it was structurally showing a deficit regarding the rest of the world. In reality, 
this surplus position should be linked to the devaluation of the RMB of almost 50% in 1994. 
Table 3 shows that it was the higher devaluation of the Chinese currency since more than 
twenty years. Moreover, despite the successive revaluations made by the monetary 
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authorities, the RMB is largely undervalued. Actually, they did not yield to the pressure of 
Washington that wants China to revaluate RMB significantly. 
 
Figure 2: Chinese Exports (X) and Imports (IM) 
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                            Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006 
 
Last but not least, the opening of the Chinese economy has accelerated since its entry into 
the WTO in December 2001. The growth rate of exports has reached an unequalled level: 
28.4% in 2005 (cf. Table 4). We can therefore say that with the post-socialist transformation, 
China now follows a new strategy of growth which can be coined an export-led growth 
regime. 
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Table 3: Exchange Rate RMB/Dollar 
Periods Exchange rate 
1985 2.93 
1986 3.45 
1987-1988 3.72 
1989 3.76 
1990 4.78 
1991 5.32 
1992 5.51 
1993 5.76 
1994 8.61 
1995 8.35 
1996 8.31 
1997-2004 8.28 
2005 8.07 
                                Source: National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical Yearbook, 2006 
 
Table 4: Growth rate of Chinese exports 
Years 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth rate (%) 6.8 22.3 34.6 35.4 28.4 27.2 
                       Source: US-China Business Council, 2007 
 
The Export-led growth strategy per se 
At the end of the seventies, China broke with the Maoist conception of economics by 
fitting into the world economy. Export-led growth corresponds to a growth regime that is not 
proper to China since it constituted the main source of income for several Southeast Asian 
economies. An export-led growth strategy consists in promoting the production of goods that 
will be sold on external markets. According to this conception, international trade is seen as 
the source of growth and the main cause of economic development. Opening up a country’s 
market to international competition exposes its economy to a “learning by doing” process that 
brings about new technologies. Indeed, several Asian countries (South Korea, Taiwan…) left 
the status of a developing economy (for the one of a recently industrialized country) by 
following an export-led growth strategy.  
 
It is possible to make a list of arguments justifying the adoption of such a regime: 
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♦ Participating in international trade forces countries to integrate new technologies in 
order to be competitive on external markets. This tends to encourage the emergence of 
technological innovations and their diffusion into the other sectors of the economy, 
with the consequence of increasing the level of production and important economies 
of scale (Felipe, 2003). 
♦ Developing countries really need foreign exchange in order to buy their imports from 
developed countries. The best way consists in increasing the amount of exports, which 
enables to raise the capacity to import without deteriorating the trade balance 
(Thirlwall 1994, 2002). 
♦ Imports (permitted by exports) may be productive because several crucial goods 
(capital goods, high-technology equipment…) necessary for economic development 
are not produced domestically (Thirlwall 2002). 
♦ An export-led growth strategy also allows an expansion of aggregate demand without 
much inflationary pressure and the appearance of a wage-price spiral as it may be the 
case after an increase in domestic demand (cf. Felipe, 2003; Felipe and Lim, 2005). 
 
In consequence, we follow Felipe and Lim (2005) who consider that a country adopts an 
export-led growth strategy if the following conditions hold: 
 
(i) High export growth accompanied by high GDP growth. 
(ii) A substantial improvement in net export growth, which means that exports grow 
faster than imports. 
 
Regarding these two criteria, we shall see that China has adopted an export-led growth 
strategy. Indeed, it takes advantage of a great capacity to export. Hereafter, we shall deal with 
the risks and constraints of the Chinese development regime based on the importance of 
exports and followed after the post-socialist transformation. 
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III. Constraints and risks concerning the Chinese growth strategy 
 
III.1. Investment-led growth economy and macroeconomic stability 
Investment hunger generates inflation. In order to understand this situation, we should first 
look into the nature of prices in a socialist economy. The inflation issue is closely related to 
prices issue. In the socialist economies (the classical system), the producer prices are 
officially administrative producer prices. However, reality is complex and it is therefore very 
difficult to control them administratively. Prices are in fact pseudo-administrative prices 
(Kornai, 1992, p. 149). In China, before 1979, almost all prices were controlled by the State. 
They were then gradually liberalized. 
Inflation exists in socialist and capitalist systems. But it does not have the same nature in 
both systems. There are indeed three types of inflation: open, repressed and hidden inflation 
(Kornai, 1992). Open inflation corresponds to an increase in prices that encounter no 
administrative resistance. The repressed inflation is artificially contained due to the presence 
of administrative prices. And the third kind of inflation refers to the inflation which is not 
declared by the government: for ideological reasons, it can deliberately underestimate 
inflation statistics. 
In the case of China, economic decentralization leads to coordination failures in the 
management of the economy in particular regarding investment which results in inflation. 
Thus, reforms turned repressed inflation (particular to socialist economies) into open inflation. 
Inflation is a sensitive political question in China. In effect, the Chinese hyperinflation of the 
1940's left a trace on Chinese collective memory like the German hyperinflation of the 1920's. 
The CCP is thus motivated to control inflationary pressures. However, inflation is not 
appreciated in the same way by central government and provinces. Provinces, unlike the 
central government, have no incentives to control it because they prefer a high level of 
employment (Vahabi, 2002). 
How can the central government stabilize inflation? It can be good, at least in the short 
term, to control it administratively. According to Vahabi (2002), stabilizing inflation requires 
the combination of two elements: a budgetary discipline and a strict monetary policy. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult because inflation is linked with local initiatives and it is therefore 
tricky for the central government to regulate it. 
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III.2. The constraints regarding the export-led growth strategy 
Recently, Palley (2006) analysed the Chinese growth strategy in a Post-Keynesian 
perspective. According to him, low labor costs combined with a huge reservoir of poor 
workers, contributed to bring foreign investors on the national territory (cf. Table 5). The 
contribution of external technologies, through foreign direct investment (FDI) allowed China 
to develop its industrial sector and to modify the structure of its production. A crucial point 
must be underlined regarding this aspect: Chinese production is mainly intended for the US 
and European markets. Moreover, the rural depopulation helps in keeping low wages and, 
thus, indirectly contributes to perpetuate a developing strategy based on a “blind” promotion 
of exports. 
 
Table 5: FDI in China (Billions of Dollars) 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FDI 45.2 45.6 40.3 40.7 46.8 52.7 53.3 60.6 60.3 63.0 
      Source: US-China Business Council, 2007 
 
This leads us to emphasize a risk that China may have to face: how to absorb a decrease in 
exports (i.e. its main source of growth)? The main difficulty here is that China has become 
more and more dependant on the level of its exports, so that an external recession could have 
an important negative impact on its internal conditions. 
 
Table 6: Data regarding China’s global demand 
               Share of expenditure components in real GDP (%) 
 Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Exports Imports 
1973 55.7   9.4   5.0   4.1 
1983 54.3 12.1 13.2 13.4 
1993 49.1 13.1 18.6 19.3 
2003 39.6 12.0 24.4 18.6 
 
                Average growth rates of expenditure components  
               based on constant prices (1990) 
 Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Exports Imports 
1973-1983   9.0 14.7 40.6 52.3 
1983-1993 16.1 18.0 26.7 27.7 
1993-2003 14.2 12.2 21.8 13.3 
 
 13
               Contribution of demand components to GDP growth (%)4 
 Private 
Consumption 
Public 
Consumption 
Exports Imports 
1973-1983 52.9 15.2 22.3 23.6 
1983-1993 45.9 13.6 21.9 23.1 
1993-2003 32.9 11.3 28.6 18.1 
               Source: Felipe and Lim (2005) 
 
As an illustration, Table 6 above clearly demonstrates that the share of exports in Chinese 
GDP never stopped growing during thirty years. More recent data from the US-China 
business council for 2004 and 2005 confirm this trend. The contribution of external demand, 
i.e. exports, to GDP growth has also raised to reach its highest level since the 1973-1983 
decade. Moreover, by using data from Tables 2 and 6 we are able to conclude that, according 
to Felipe and Lim’s criteria, China has really adopted an export-led growth regime. 
Nevertheless, this strategy could well come up against the following macroeconomic 
constraint: in order to keep on growing, China needs that American and European households 
keep on importing Chinese manufactured goods at the same rate, otherwise an imported 
recession could not be easily avoided. If it maintains its actual growth strategy, in the case of 
a fall in exports, domestic demand will not be able to take over external demand. This 
assessment is based on two arguments. First, it is unlikely that investment counterbalances a 
decline in exports since its prime objective is to increase the capacity production of Chinese 
manufactured goods destined, to a large extent, to external markets. Second, the share of 
households’ consumption in GDP has reached a very low level. The crucial point here is the 
following: the contribution of consumption to GDP has never been so low since thirty years 
(from 52.9% to 32.9% between 1973 and 2003 according to Table 6). This established fact 
brings us to consider that Chinese authorities do not really envisage the domestic market as a 
natural outlet for their firms. Therefore, it seems that China is, notwithstanding high growth 
rates, relatively vulnerable to negative shocks on external demand. According to us, this 
economic situation is a direct consequence of the post-socialist transformation. This is what 
we shall assess in the following section. 
 
III.3. Risks and threats from the post-socialist transformation 
The macroeconomic constraint exposed above constitutes a risky situation for China in the 
case of a contraction in international markets and particularly in the United States. Indeed, 
                                                 
4
 In the third part of Table 5 imports represent a negative contribution. 
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they still absorb one third of Chinese exports (cf. Table 7) which represents more than any 
other country. Actually, China is often considered as the main responsible of the abyssal US 
trade deficit (about $716 billion in 2005 according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis). 
Therefore, it is possible to summarize the economic threats for China in the following way: in 
the medium and long run can we reasonably ignore the possibility of a fall in external demand 
from the US?  
 
Since the main difficulty to which the Chinese export-led growth regime could be confronted 
with concerns the occurrence of an external contraction, we have to assess why such an event 
may appear. In consequence, hereafter, we provide a list of external risks and their possible 
outlets in order to emphasize the economic vulnerability of China. 
 
Risk 1: The tightening of economic policy 
The first risk concerns the possibility of a tightening in fiscal (an increase in tax in order to 
counterbalance the current deficit) or monetary (a raise in the Federal funds rate to avoid an 
increase in inflation) policy. The US budget deficit is still high, notwithstanding high growth 
rates in 2004 and 2005. Indeed, it represents 2.36% of GDP at the third quarter of 2006 (cf. 
Table 8). A crucial point is that such a disequilibrium cannot last forever. However, the 
policies that allow to reduce this deficit may well have recessive consequences. Assuming a 
constant GDP growth rate, the Government has two choices: either it raises the level of taxes 
or it strongly diminishes public spending. In both cases, this affects negatively the amount of 
GDP. In the same vein, an increase in the rate of interest would have a negative impact on 
economic activity. 
Table 7: Chinese exports (Billions of Dollars) 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Total exports 249.2 266.2 325.6 438.4 539.4 762.0 
Exports towards 
the US 100.0 109.4 133.5 163.2 210.5 259.8 
Ratio of 
dependence (%)   40.0   41.1   41.0   37.2   39.0   34.0 
           Source: US-China Business Council, 2006 and WTO, 2006 
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Risk 2: The endogenous recession 
An endogenous contraction in the US, for example through a decline in household 
consumption, represents a serious threat for China. We think it should not be underestimated 
since consumption growth has been largely financed via indebtedness, due to very favourable 
financial conditions (in 2004 the Fed funds rate was at 1%) which contributed to raise prices 
in the real estate sector. Even though these two phenomena have their own limitations, 
monetary policy mistakes, for instances a wrong increase in the interest rate, would be 
sufficient to put an end to this period of consumption-led growth. Moreover, on the 
assumption of an internal contraction, it is unlikely to wait for an “assisted” recovery by the 
US Government, as was the case in 2001. Indeed, before 2001 it ran a budget surplus of $159 
billion, which is very different from the current deficit of $311 billion (cf. Table 8). The main 
issue here is to know whether it will be able to stimulate domestic demand, as it did between 
mid-2000 and 2005, by creating 1.13 million jobs in the public sector, in order to 
counterbalance the decline in private-sector employment between 2001 and mid-2003 (cf. 
Figure 3). However, such an intervention seems unlikely simply because the room to 
manoeuvre is very small with respect to the current US budget deficit. 
 
Figure 3: Private-sector employment in the US (thousands of workers) 
 
                             Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Table 8: US public deficit (Billions of dollars) 
Year a 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Budget deficit 159.0 - 39.3 - 396.7 - 543.3 - 553.6 - 474.8 - 311.7 
Deficit/GDP (%) 1.61 - 0.38 - 3.78 - 4.95 - 4.71 - 3.80 - 2.36 
   Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, a third quarter of 2006. 
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An endogenous recession in the US would surely be the worst scenario for China’s economy. 
Other things constant, it would have a deep and negative impact on its GDP through the 
export channel. As Estiot (2003) recalls, the economic history of the US shows that its 
imports are very sensitive to internal economic conditions. For example, over the declining 
period 1987-1991, the trade deficit has been divided by almost five, diminishing from $151 
billion to $31 billion (cf. Table 9). Moreover, taking into account the strong dependence of 
China towards the US, the effect will certainly be magnified. 
 
 
Table 9: US trade deficit (Billions of Dollars) 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Trade balance - 151.6 - 114.5 - 93.14 - 80.86 - 31.13 
                     Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
Risk 3: A counterbalancing European effect? 
Previously, we implicitly assumed that China had bilateral trade relations with one country, 
i.e. the US. In reality, the Euro-zone also constitutes an important outlet for Chinese 
manufactured goods. At this stage, it is quite justified to ask the following question: in the 
case of a recession in the US, is Europe able to absorb Chinese exports and avoid a deep 
economic contraction in China? If so, such a mechanism would be rather limited. Indeed, it 
seems very difficult for Europe to absorb the totality of the decrease in Chinese exports. Table 
10 indicates the amount of US and European imports from China: 
 
 
We observe that the average growth rates of imports of the US and Europe from China are, 
respectively, 24.1% and 30.5%. Assuming a 10% decrease in US imports, i.e. $25.9 billion, 
which represents a very limited decline regarding Table 9, some simple calculations show that 
European imports should increase by 43.7% in order to counterbalance the fall in US imports. 
However, this is largely beyond the average growth rate of European imports between 2001 
Table 10: Imports of the US and European Union from China (Billions of dollars) 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
US 109.4 133.5 163.2 210.5 259.8 
European Uniona 67.3 77.1 107.8 157.8 195.8 
 Source: WTO, a European Union (25) after 2003 
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and 2005 (30.5%). At this stage, the counterbalancing thesis seems very unlikely. Besides, a 
recession in the US would have negative consequences in the Euro zone since European 
countries are also dependant on the US through their exports. Consequently, if economic 
conditions are also deteriorated in Europe, that would certainly magnify the negative impact 
on China’s exports. 
 
Risk 4: Non-strictly economic threats 
In this last scenario, we consider a non-strictly economic constraint for China. We hence 
deal with events, not directly linked to an economic cause (US recession, economic policy 
mistake), but that have negative repercussions on Chinese exports. For instances, we may take 
into account the threats of a protectionist temptation. Although this risk is relatively low in the 
scope of international economic relations under the rules of the WTO, we cannot ignore it. 
Notwithstanding the pressures emanating, among others, from the US Congress and asking 
for a substantial revaluation of RMB, the exchange rate remained relatively constant over the 
past decade. Therefore, considering the resistance of Chinese authorities to revaluate, we 
cannot abandon the possibility of an increase in import duty on Chinese manufactured goods. 
An alternative solution, sketched by Stiglitz and Lau (cf. Financial Times, April 25th 2005), 
would be that China decides to impose a tax on its exports. Such a policy would have two 
main advantages: (i) an export tax could generate important revenue for Government 
authorities and (ii) “it would not lead to financial losses for Chinese holders of dollars-
denominated assets” (People’s Bank of China, commercial banks and firms). Nevertheless, 
whether it concerns a protectionist temptation or an export tax, these policies would not 
change the negative impact of a fall in exports on Chinese growth. In other respects, Stiglitz 
(2006) also refers to the fact that China should “put more emphasis on managing domestic 
demand growth”. 
In consequence, the risks considered above indicate that an export-led growth strategy, 
making China too dependant of its exports, is dangerous for its stability and growth in the 
medium and long run. Indeed, for some years, various studies insist on the risk that such a 
strategy, if generalized, would represent (cf. Erturk, 2001-2002; Blecker, 2002, 2003; Palley, 
2002) and on the appearance of a crowding-out effect (Palley, 2003). Export-led development 
may work when adopted by one or a few countries, but it loses its property when adopted by 
all. Today, too many Asian Governments have adopted an export-led growth strategy, 
ignoring this crucial point. This is what Blecker calls “a fallacy of composition”. The main 
problem here is that a whole continent, including its biggest country, decided to base its 
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development on such a strategy. By following this logic, China has become a global 
manufacturer without assessing the consequences of such a policy in the case of an external 
recession. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article is an attempt to deal with the post-socialist transformation in China. During the 
Maoist era, as for the other socialist countries, the Chinese economy was characterized by 
forced growth (cf. Kornai, 1972). However, since the end of the seventies, it progressively 
changed by promoting its exports. This development could involve several difficulties in the 
medium and long run. The main problem is that China could come up against an external 
constraint and, in particular, an imported recession from the US. Indeed, many factors tend to 
show that we cannot ignore the possibility of a contraction in the US that could not be 
counterbalanced through an increase in the level of European demand for Chinese 
manufactured goods. In addition, Chinese domestic-demand is too low to prevent the negative 
consequence of a decrease in exports. The crucial point here is that whatever the scenario 
(endogenous recession in the US, a tightening in monetary or fiscal policy…), the impact 
would be negative on China’s economy. 
Regarding these risks, what are the different solutions for Chinese authorities? An intuitive 
answer would consist in adopting an alternative growth regime with domestic demand 
replacing exports, at least partially. However, such a change is not so easily achievable for 
two reasons. First, we showed that the post-socialist transformation is an institutional and 
systemic change, the new growth regime based on exports being one of its main 
characteristics. Consequently, it is overdetermined by several institutional factors, which 
make it difficult to change in a conscious way. Structural reforms are needed to diminish the 
risks following the Chinese export-led growth strategy. Nevertheless, these reforms will have 
to do with the inertia of Chinese saving behaviors, due to the absence of a welfare state. The 
Chinese government does not support old age pensions, unemployment and health care. In 
addition, many households save in order to finance the higher education of their children. 
Second, an increase in households’ purchasing power, involving a raise in domestic demand, 
could have a negative impact on inflation. Here, the main issue is to know whether the raise in 
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domestic demand is capable of counterbalancing the fall in exports following the expected 
increase in inflation. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Blecker, R. (2002), “The Balance-of-Payments-Constrained Growth Model and the Limits to 
Export-Led Growth”, in Davidson, P. (ed.), A Post Keynesian Perspective on the 
Twenty-First Century Economic Problems, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Blecker, R. (2003), “The Diminishing Returns to Export-Led Growth”, in Mead, W.R., 
Schwenninger, S.R. (eds), The Bridge to a Global Middle Class: Development, Trade, 
and International Finance in the 21st Century, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Cass, D. (1965), “Optimum Growth in an Aggregative Model of Capital Accumulation”, 
Review of Economic Studies, vol. 32, 3, pp. 233-240. 
Erturk, K. (2001-2002), “Over Capacity and the East Asian Crisis”, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, vol. 24, 2, pp. 253-277. 
Estiot, A. (2003), “Is the US Current Account Deficit a Black Hole?”, Conjoncture BNP-
Paribas, October. 
Felipe, J. (2003), “Is Export-Led Growth Passé? Implications for Developing Asia”, Working 
Paper, n° 48, Economics and Research Department, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 
Philippines. 
Felipe, J., Lim J. A. (2005), “Export or Domestic-Led Growth in Asia?”, Asian Development 
Review, vol. 22, 2, pp. 35-75. 
Havrylchyk, O. (2005), “L’avancée des réformes bancaires chinoises”, La lettre du CEPII, n° 
248, Septembre. 
Keynes, J.M. (1936), The General Theory of employment, interest and money, London, 
Macmillan and Co. 
Kornai, J. (1972), Rush versus Harmonic Growth, Amsterdam-London, North-Holland 
Publishing Company. 
Kornai, J. (1979), “Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems”, 
Econometrica, vol. 47, 4, pp. 801-819. 
Kornai, J. (1980), Economics of Shortage, Amsterdam, North-Holland. 
Kornai, J. (1986), “The Soft Budget Constraint”, Kyklos, vol. 39, 1, pp. 3-30. 
Kornai, J. (1992), The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Kornai, J. (1993), “The Evolution of Financial Discipline under the Postsocialist System”, 
Kyklos, vol. 46, 3, pp. 315-336. 
Kornai, J. (2000), “What the Change of System From Socialism to Capitalism Does and Does 
Not Mean”, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 14, 1, pp. 27-42. 
Li D.D. (1998), “Changing Incentives of the Chinese Bureaucracy”, American Economic 
Review, vol. 88, 2, pp. 393-397. 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Oi, J.C. (1992), “Fiscal reform and the economics foundations of local state corporatism in 
China”, World Politics, 45, October, pp. 99-126. 
Oi, J.C. (1996), “The Role of the Local State in China's Transitional Economy”, in Walder, A. 
G. (ed.), China's Transitional Economy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 20
Oi, J.C. (1999), Rural China Takes Off. Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform, Los 
Angeles, University of California Press. 
Palley, T. (2002), “Domestic Demand-Led Growth: A New Paradigm for Development”, in 
Weaver, J., Jacobs, D., Baker, J. (Eds), After Neo-liberalism: Economic Policies That 
Work for the Poor, Washington DC, New Rules for Global International Finance. 
Palley, T. (2003), “Export-Led Growth: Evidence of Developing Country Crowding-out”, in 
Arestis, P., Baddeley, M., Mc Combie, J. (Eds), Globalisation, Regionalism and 
Economic Activity, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Palley, T. (2006), “External Contradictions of the Chinese Development Model: Why China 
Must Abandon Export-led Growth or Risk a Global Economic Contraction”, Journal of 
contemporary China, vol. 15, 46, pp. 69-88. 
Solow, R. (1956) “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, vol. 70, 1, pp. 65-94. 
Stiglitz, J.E. (2006), “China and the Global Economy: Challenges, Opportunities, 
Responsibilities”, in Sang Ho, L., Ash, R. (Eds) China, Hong Kong and the World 
Economy: Studies on Globalization, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Thirlwall, A.P. (1994), Growth and Development, London, Macmillan. 
Thirlwall, A.P. (2002), The Nature of Economic Growth: An Alternative Framework for 
Understanding the Performance of Nations, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar. 
Vahabi, M. (2002), “La ‘fringale’ d’investissement, le fédéralisme économique et la stabilité 
macro-économique en Chine”, in Andreff, W. (ed.), Analyses économiques de la 
transition, Paris, La Découverte. 
